1 of such systems. Like classical Greece, but unlike classical China or Renaissance Italy, Europe has not coalesced into one state, but has persisted for centuries as a system.
2
These different historical outcomes raise theoretical questions of some interest.
We here test against ancient and modern examples one theory of the behavior of states. This is the Democratic Peace (DP) theory, which holds that democratic states 3 4 never attack each other, or do so far less often than do nondemocratic states. If so, 5 democratic political structure in single states will be a significant predictor of system stability. The DP theory seems to be successful in predicting known outcomes in early China (no democratic states, continual war, unification) and also in early Greece (some democratic states; some war; no unification). We note, however, that the theory fails with modern South America, and conclude that factors other than political structure must be invoked to explain multi-state outcomes, whether ancient or modern.
Data. DP theories abound; some proponents emphasize the "liberal" aspect of "democracy." We chose for testing the Polity IV list, which assigns to states a 6 democracy index ranging from -10 to +10, on criteria established by CIDCM.
7
Perhaps the chief anomaly of the list, for any period earlier than the late 20c, is the 8 presence of Germany and the absence of France. Oren Subjectivity traces the Germanic bias of DP theory (with Kant Peace as its foundation document) to Woodrow Wilson (1856 Wilson ( -1924 , who despised "French democracy" and admired "German constitutionalism," and to John Burgess (1844 Burgess ( -1931 before him, who saw Imperial German structure as ideal for preserving peace (Burgess Emperor), and thought South America undeserving of "scientific treatment" (Burgess Political 1/3-5). On this last point, we beg to differ.
Over the period in question, the major South American conflicts are: (1) between Paraguay 9 and the Triple Alliance (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay; 1865-1870), which arose from Brazilian reprisals against Uruguay for mistreatment of its citizens in Uruguay's civil war, and ended in defeat but not extinction or absorption for Paraguay; (2) the nitrate wars between Chile and the allied states of Bolivia and Peru (1879-1884) , which ended with territorial gains by Chile and the ongoing tensions of the Tacna-Aria dispute, which were finally resolved by mediation in 1929; and (3) the Chaco Wars (1928) (1929) (1930) (1933) (1934) (1935) , in which Paraguay gained territory from Bolivia. It will be obvious that landlocked Paraguay and Bolivia are a geopolitical focus in these wars; see Child Geopolitics and Kelly Checkerboards. greater analytical interest is the fact that no South American country makes the CIDCM +10 list. If indeed those states are not "democratic," it follows from DP theory that they will be much more mutually bellicose than a counterpart European "democratic" group (say, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Greece, Norway, Sweden). But in the period since South American 8 independence (c1830), in addition to local conflicts, Europe has twice been kept from unifying through war only by substantial outside-power intervention. By contrast, and apart from any turbulence in individual states, the South American states as a group have experienced few conflicts of importance during that period, and despite those 9 conflicts, they have retained their individual identity and their collective equilibrium as a stable system. South America thus reverses DP expectations, and we must account in other ways for its relatively pacific system character. To begin with, we note that these states have an entire history in common. Their invention as Western-oriented nations derives from a remarkably uniform and artificial construct imposed by Spain over centuries. This construct becomes somewhat less coherent and loses its central regulatory apparatus in the independence transition (1810-1830), but the ensuing conflicts are more akin to the readjustment of local boundaries than to the conflicts of conquest and control, or an effort to create or recreate empires.
The formulation of Alastair Iain Johnston (WSW, 18 Nov 2002).
10
In China, an increase in cultural unity in an originally multicultural system accompanied 11 an 04c escalation of severity in the wars of unification.
For Greek cultural unity as not containing a political unity agenda, see Finley Nation.
12
That is, the peace question, though statable in political science terms, may not be wholly One variant of DP runs: "Contemporary liberal democracies tend to recognize in other liberal democracies a preference for resolving disputes through mediation . . . They tend to believe that together liberal democracies constitute a shared 'ingroup,' or in Karl Deutsch's words, a 'security community' in which it is almost impossible to envision the use of major force to resolve disputes among the members." 10 A New Theory. The South American case suggests eliminating the D from DP, thus: Other things being equal, states of similar structure and tradition, whatever the content of that structure and tradition, will regard each other as nonthreatening, and will view states of different structure and tradition with suspicion. But replacing DP with a one-factor "identity peace" (IP) theory creates a problem with the classical Greek and Chinese systems, since a common tradition in classical China seems to have supported, but in classical Greece seems to have inhibited, the unification process.
We conclude that additional factors need to be considered. Our suggestions follow.
Factors Supporting System Stability
One factor is cultural. Warlike states are more warlike than other states. And 13 belligerent social style is independent of political type; thus, a vendetta culture may coexist with autocratic (Ha ! n China) or democratic (19c US) political structures.
14 Even warlike states may not feel impelled to make the effort of unification. Cultural unity may justify an attempt at political unity, or it may also substitute for it. The presence or absence of a cultural unity agenda may be decisive.
Military effectiveness also counts. The Spring and Autumn Chinese states fought, but were not strong enough to destroy each other. In Warring States times, political 15 and military reforms made definitive war possible. This efficiency transition did not occur in Greece. If we distinguish phases, and note military capacity as the new factor in the second phase, the classical Chinese case becomes analytically tractable.
Again, war may be inhibited by diplomacy, which may create alliances or other structures which operate to contain a conquest push. The "Balance of Powers" concept recognizes one self-regulating device in multi-state systems: the conscious wish of other states not to have the multi-state equilibrium become too far unbalanced by the success of any one state. 16 And in addition to the internal factors of heritage coherence, warlikeness, political unity agenda, and military and diplomatic expertise, we note the external factor of resource differential as a root cause of conflict among states, whether those states are intrinsically bellicose or pacific in character. This is notably true in the South American case, where the issues in two of the three major wars involved such things as the exploitation of mineral resources and direct access to the sea. We may add that shifts in resource use, such as technological change brings about, are likely to redraw the previous resource map, and define new zones and fault lines of potential conflict between states. In many cases, such zones and fault lines form the grid on which other disposing factors are graphed out.
Our Formulation
We would summarize the above findings in this way: States with a common heritage, whatever the content of that heritage, will tend to regard each other as nonthreatening, and the system of those states will tend to be peaceful and stable. Intrinsic belligerence, resource differentials, or a political unity agenda, will dispose toward wars of conquest, but such attempts at expansion or unification will fail unless supported by adequate military means, or if prevented or countered by adequate diplomatic and military measures.
This formula, though it is more complex than the one we began by considering, may for that very reason more adequately explain multi-state situations of the kind that are actually encountered in history.
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